Scale-invariant cellular automata and self-similar Petri nets

Two novel computing models based on an infinite tessellation of space-time are introduced. They consist of recursively coupled primitive building blocks. The first model is a scale-invariant generalization of cellular automata, whereas the second one utilizes self-similar Petri nets. Both models are capable of hypercomputations and can, for instance, "solve" the halting problem for Turing machines. These two models are closely related, as they exhibit a step-by-step equivalence for finite computations. On the other hand, they differ greatly for computations that involve an infinite number of building blocks: the first one shows indeterministic behavior whereas the second one halts. Both models are capable of challenging our understanding of computability, causality, and space-time.Comment: 35 pages, 5 figure

Retail Rate Impacts of Distributed Solar: Focus on New England

The Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) recently issued a study entitled “Putting the Potential Rate Impacts of Distributed Solar into Context,” authored by Galen Barbose. The LBNL study estimates the potential rate impact of distributed solar on national average retail electricity prices, and importantly, compares that impact to the potential impact of other rate drivers such as natural gas prices, renewable portfolio standards, and utility capital expenditures.1 This brief applies a similar style analysis as used by LBNL to regional and state level data to estimate more granular impacts for New England. We estimate rate impacts for various penetration rates of net metered distributed solar and compare them to the potential rate impacts of future natural gas prices, energy efficiency gains, RPS costs, RGGI costs, and utility capital expenditures. Like LBNL, we attempt to isolate the impact of these rate drivers as well as represent uncertainty around future policy choices, commodity costs, and technology costs

Would you like to be a prosumer? Information revelation, personalization and price discrimination in electronic markets

Electronic commerce and flexible manufacturing allow personalization of initially standardized products at low cost. Will customers provide the information necessary for personalization? Assuming that a consumer can control the amount of information revealed, we analyze how his decision interacts with the pricing strategy of a monopolist who may abuse the information to obtain a larger share of total surplus. We consider two scenarios, one where consumers have different tastes but identical willingness to pay and another with high and low valuation customers. In both cases full revelation may only result if the monopolist can commit to a maximum price before consumers decide about disclosure. -- Elektronischer Handel und flexible Produktionstechnologien ermöglichen eine kostengünstige Personalisierung ehemals standardisierter Produkte, allerdings benötigt der Produzent hierfür Informationen vom Kunden über dessen Präferenzen. Ausgehend von der Annahme, dass die Kunden selbst darüber entscheiden können, in welchem Ausmaß sie diese Informationen preisgeben, wird hier analysiert, wie diese Entscheidung des Kunden mit der Preispolitik eines Monopolisten interagiert, der mit Hilfe zusätzlicher Informationen zwar das Produkt besser an die Wünsche des Kunden anzupassen vermag, sein Wissen allerdings auch dazu missbrauchen kann, sich einen größeren Anteil des Handelsgewinns anzueignen. Bei heterogenen Präferenzen der Konsumenten zeigt sich sowohl für den Fall einer einheitlichen Zahlungsbereitschaft, als auch für den Fall unterschiedlicher Kundentypen mit hoher und niedriger Zahlungsbereitschaft, dass die Konsumenten nur dann zu einer vollständigen Informationsrevelation bereit sind, wenn sich der Monopolist im Vorfeld der Revelationsentscheidung glaubhaft an ein Preisschema binden kann.E-Commerce,Personalization,Asymmetric information,Price discrimination,Elektronische Märkte,Personalisierung,Asymmetrische Information,Preisdiskriminierung

Would You Like to Be a Prosumer? Information Revelation, Personalization and Price Discrimination in Electronic Markets

Electronic commerce and flexible manufacturing allow personalization of initially standardized products at low cost. Will customers provide the information necessary for personalization? Assuming that a consumer can control the amount of information revealed, we analyse how his decision interacts with the pricing strategy of a monopolist who may abuse the information to obtain a larger share of total surplus. We consider two scenarios, one where consumers have different tastes but identical willingness to pay and another with high and low valuation customers. In both cases full revelation may only result if the monopolist can commit to a maximum price before consumers decide about disclosure.E-Commerce, Personalization, Asymmetric information, Price discrimination

Incentives to Invest in Electronic Coordination: Under- or Overinvestment in Equilibrium?

Do firms have proper incentives to invest in electronic coordination? We discuss this question in an oligopoly model with a local firm and a distant competitor that may reduce transport costs by investing in electronic coordination. In a two-stage game with investment in the first stage and price or quantity competition with differentiated products in the second stage we compare profit maximizing investment with (constrained) welfare maximization by a social planer. Depending on market demand, firm conduct and investment costs either over- or underinvestment may result: The firm will overinvest if the negative impact on its competitor exceeds the gain in consumer surplus. This is shown to be especially likely under quantity competition with (almost) homogenous products.Electronic Markets; Strategic Investments; Transport Costs; Product Differentiation

Electronic coordination in oligopolistic markets: Impact on transport costs and product differentiation

Electronic coordination links markets at different locations that have initially been (partially) separated by transport costs. Rising competitive pressure should in turn affect incentives to differentiate products. In this paper investment decisions concerning transport cost reduction and product differentiation are analyzed in a heterogenous product duopoly where firms compete in two spatially separated markets. We show that firms always have nonnegative incentives to invest in transport cost reduction, while there exist parameter ranges where product differentiation will actually be reduced after an exogenous reduction of transport cost. We also compare social and privat investment incentives for both price strategies (most likely with digital products) and quantity competition (capacity decisions for physical products). Based on these results we discuss in detail how investment decisions are likely to differ from the efficient solution for each of the two kind of products. -- Durch elektronische Koordination wachsen räumlich getrennte Märkte zusammen, die bislang nur unvollständig ökonomisch integriert waren. Der daraus resultierende verstärkte Wettbewerbsdruck sollte die Anreize der Unternehmen zur Produktdifferenzierung eigentlich erhöhen. Wir analysieren die Interaktion der Investitionsentscheidungen in transportkostensenkende elektronische Koordination und in verstärkte Produktdifferenzierung in einem Duopol mit räumlich getrennten Märkten. Wir zeigen, dass immer ein zumindest schwach positiver Anreiz zur Investition in Transportkostensenkung besteht, während Parameterbereiche existieren in denen die Unternehmen nach einer exogenen Senkung der Transportkosten die Produktdifferenzierung verringern. Des Weiteren vergleichen wir soziale und private Investitionsanreize sowohl bei Preisstrategien (plausibel bei digitalen Gütern) als auch bei Mengenwettbewerb (realistisch als Kapazitätsentscheidung bei physischen Produkten) und diskutieren im Detail, welche Abweichung von der effizienten Entscheidung bei jeder der beiden Produkttypen zu erwarten ist.Electronic markets,Strategic investments,Transport costs,Product differentiation,Elektronische Märkte,Strategische Investition,Transportkosten,Produktdifferentierung

Health as a driving economic force

This chapter illustrates the contribution which could be made to realising the Lisbon Strategy of the European Union for growth and jobs by innovative healthcare policy favouring a preventive orientation of healthcare. The prevention and control of risk factors for chronic diseases, as well as their potential impact on the quality of human capital as a union of health and education, are discussed. Human capital refers to health and education both of the individual, and of the population as a whole… --

The Sociology of the Life Course and Life Span Psychology: Integrated Paradigm or Complementing Pathways?

The psychology of the life span and the sociology of the life course share the same object of scientific inquiry - the lives of women and men from birth to death. Both are part of an interdisciplinary field focused on individual development and life course patterns which also includes social demography and human capital economics. However, a closer look shows that life span psychology and life course sociology now to stand further apart than in the seventies. In this paper we reassess how this divergence can be understood in terms of necessary and legitimate strengths of both approaches, as well as avoidable weaknesses which could be overcome in the future by more re-combination and integration.